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DISINHERITANCE OF MINOR CHILDREN:  
A PROPOSAL TO AMEND THE  
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE 
Jacqueline Asadorian* 
Abstract: With the single exception of Louisiana, the United States pro-
vides no legislative protection against the disinheritance of minor chil-
dren by their parents. This position is distinct from most other countries 
in the world, which require parents to provide for their children at death. 
Freedom of testation, a distinctly American value, is at odds with another 
value Americans hold dear: support and protection of one’s family. This 
Note argues that the balance between these two discordant values has 
tipped too far in the direction of testamentary freedom, to the detriment 
of minor children. Non-custodial children are disproportionally affected 
by this lack of protection because they are the most likely group to be dis-
inherited. Rather than rely on courts to inconsistently and arbitrarily pro-
tect children against disinheritance, this Note suggests that states should 
adopt forced heirship legislation to ensure that children are supported af-
ter the death of their parents. 
Introduction 
God Planted in Men a strong desire . . . of propagating their Kind, 
and continuing themselves in their Posterity, and this gives Children a 
Title, to share in the Property of their Parents, and a Right to Inherit 
their Possessions. Men are not Proprietors of what they have merely for 
themselves, their Children have a Title to part of it . . . . 
—John Locke1 
 Despite John Locke’s view, which is codified in some form in most 
countries, the United States fails to protect minor children from disin-
                                                                                                                      
* Note Editor, Boston College Third World Law Journal (2010–2011). 
1 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government 206–07 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1988) (1690). But see Jesse Dukeminier et al., Wills, Trusts, and Estates 1 
(8th ed. 2009). In a 1789 letter to James Madison, Thomas Jefferson stated: “The earth 
belongs in usufruct to the living; the dead have neither powers nor rights over it. The por-
tion occupied by any individual ceases to be his when he himself ceases to be, and reverts 
to society.” Id. 
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heritance by their parents.2 While most other modern countries re-
quire parents to provide for their children after death, the United 
States values freedom of testation over the moral obligation to provide 
for children at death.3 
 In the United States, laws of testation are enacted at the state level, 
and only one state—Louisiana—has enacted laws protecting children 
from parental disinheritance.4 The failure of virtually all American 
states to protect minor children from disinheritance when a parent dies 
testate (with a will) stands in contrast to intestacy statutes, which dictate 
how a decedent’s property will be distributed when he or she dies in 
the absence of a valid will, and usually provide for spouses and chil-
dren.5 
 The lack of protection for disinherited minors in the United States 
is also incongruous with the protections afforded to spouses.6 Many 
American jurisdictions provide spouses with an elective share of the 
decedent’s estate if they are written out of the testator’s will.7 Many of 
                                                                                                                      
2 See Locke, supra note 1, at 206–07; Brian C. Brennan, Note, Disinheritance of Dependent 
Children: Why Isn’t America Fulfilling its Moral Obligation?, 14 Quinnipiac Prob. L.J. 125, 125 
(1999). 
3 See Ralph C. Brashier, Protecting the Child from Disinheritance: Must Louisiana Stand 
Alone?, 57 La. L. Rev. 1, 1 (1996); Brennan, supra note 2, at 134. Among the countries that 
protect children from disinheritance are Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bul-
garia, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ec-
uador, El Salvador, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, 
India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Malta, Mexico, 
Mongolia, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Russian Federation, Scotland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, 
Uruguay, Venezuela, England, Malaysia, New Zealand, Northern Ireland, Singapore, and 
parts of Australia and Canada, and commonwealth colonies such as Hong Kong. Brashier, 
supra, at 1 n.3. Freedom of testation is defined as the largely unrestricted ability of a per-
son to choose the disposition of his or her property upon death. Restatement (Third) of 
Prop.: Wills and Other Donative Transfers § 10.1 cmt. a (2003) (“The organizing 
principle of the American law of donative transfers is freedom of disposition. Property 
owners have the nearly unrestricted right to dispose of their property as they please.”). 
4 See Brashier, supra note 3, at 1; infra Part I. 
5 Deborah A. Batts, I Didn’t Ask to be Born: The American Law of Disinheritance and a Pro-
posal for Change to a System of Protected Inheritance, 41 Hastings L.J. 1197, 1198 (1990). Intes-
tacy statutes are designed to carry out the likely intent of the average intestate decedent 
and preserve the economic health of the family after a death. See Dukeminier et al., supra 
note 1, at 75–76. 
6 See Batts, supra note 5, at 1198–99. 
7 Id. Professor Batts notes that: 
When the surviving spouse has been written out of the deceased spouse’s will, 
or has been devised inadequate assets, many American jurisdictions provide 
the surviving spouse with a remedy known as the elective share. In the major-
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the same justifications for overriding the intent of the testator to pro-
vide for an omitted spouse apply equally well to minor children who are 
disinherited by their parents.8 
 In general in the United States, protection and support of one’s 
family is highly valued.9 In fact, every state requires parents to support 
their minor children during life, and states impose civil and criminal 
penalties when these support obligations go unfulfilled.10 The impor-
tance of parental support of minor children has both moral and eco-
nomic dimensions.11 Morally, the support of children is stitched into 
the fabric of society, and states have an interest in providing for minor 
children.12 This obligation has an important economic effect as well 
because when a parent is unwilling or unable to provide for a child, the 
state must step in and provide support.13 These moral and economic 
arguments imply that parents should be obligated to provide for their 
dependent and minor children at death, as in life.14 Yet this inclination 
                                                                                                                      
ity of jurisdictions that have this remedy, the surviving spouse may receive as 
much as one-third or one-half of the estate. 
Id. This Note focuses on intentional disinheritance of minor children. See infra Part I.A. 
Many states have pretermitted heir and spouse statutes that correct testators’ wills in the 
case of unintentional disinheritance. See Dukeminier et al., supra note 1, at 527, 533; 
Ronald Chester, Disinheritance and the American Child: An Alternative from British Columbia, 
1998 Utah L. Rev. 1, 28 (“[P]retermitted heir statutes and concepts like undue influence 
do indirectly provide American children some disinheritance protection.”). The Uniform 
Probate Code (UPC) provides that if a testator fails to provide for his or her children born 
or adopted after the execution of the will, the omitted children receive a share in the es-
tate. Unif. Probate Code § 2-302 (amended 1993). Because pretermitted heir statutes 
largely solve the problem of unintentional disinheritance, this Note focuses on intentional 
disinheritance and whether it should continue to be tolerated in the United States. See 
Dukeminier et al., supra note 1, at 527. 
8 See Batts, supra note 5, at 1199 (noting that the “overriding state concern that the 
surviving spouse does not become a ward of the state” applies equally to children who may 
become wards of the state if they are disinherited). 
9 See id. at 1197 (“The sanctity and inviolability of the parent-child bond is a funda-
mental concept imbedded in America’s social and legal structure.”). 
10 See Brashier, supra note 3, at 5–7. 
11 See id. at 4–5. 
12 See id. (“Our collective moral sense informs us that each parent has an obligation to 
nurture his children until they reach adulthood.”). 
13 See id. 
14 See id. The existence of legal support obligations during a parent’s life provides fur-
ther support for the proposition that these obligations should not terminate upon the 
death of a parent. See id. at 5–6 (discussing state statutes that require parents to fulfill their 
support obligations, whenever financially possible). 
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is inherently in tension with another distinctly American value— free-
dom of testation.15 
 The American system that places paramount importance on tes-
tamentary freedom causes particular problems for non-custodial chil-
dren who are left out of their natural parents’ wills.16 These children 
are disproportionately affected by the United States’ failure to require 
their parents to provide for them at death.17 
 This Note explores the balance the United States has struck be-
tween freedom of testation and support for minor children and argues 
that the scale has tipped too far in the direction of testamentary free-
dom. Part I examines the current status of the laws of testation in the 
United States and discusses the flaws in the system that allow parents to 
disinherit their minor children without cause. Part II explores the ways 
in which American courts have attempted to “get around” testamentary 
plans that fail to provide for children through doctrines such as undue 
influence, fraud, and mental capacity. Part III posits that the current 
American system, which in effect allows courts to alter testamentary 
plans in order to provide for disinherited children, is costly, taxes judi-
cial resources, and fails to provide consistent results. Part III argues that 
these inadequacies disproportionately affect non-custodial minor chil-
dren. Finally, Part IV proposes that the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) 
should be amended to include a requirement that parents provide for 
their minor children at death. 
I. Background on the Current Status of American Laws  
of Testation as They Relate to the Disinheritance  
of Children 
 The American ideal of testamentary freedom is not a foregone 
conclusion—countries all over the world protect children from disin-
heritance, including England.18 In his Commentaries, William Black-
                                                                                                                      
15 Tamara York, Protecting Minor Children from Parental Disinheritance: A Proposal for Award-
ing a Compulsory Share of the Parental Estate, 1997 Det. C. L. Rev. 861, 871. 
16 See Brashier, supra note 3, at 3 (noting that non-custodial parents are “unlikely to 
provide for those minor children by will when disinheritance is perfectly permissible” and 
finding that the societal burden is likely to increase in our current era of “fractured fami-
lies and multiple marriages”). For the purposes of this Note, “non-custodial children” re-
fers to those children who do not physically reside with the parent at issue. See id. 
17 See Brashier, supra note 3, at 3. 
18 See Adam Dayan, Note, The Kids Aren’t Alright: An Examination of Some of the Flaws in 
American Law Regarding Child Disinheritance, the Reasons That Children Should Be Protected, and 
a Recommendation for the United States to Learn from the Australian Model That Protects Children 
Against Disinheritance, 17 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 375, 380–82 (2009). The British 
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stone noted that descent to the children of the deceased was estab-
lished by long and persisting custom.19 However established these cus-
toms were throughout the rest of the world, testamentary freedom 
overshadowed the moral obligation of providing for one’s children at 
death in the United States.20 
 Until the 1980s, it was “generally accepted that the right to trans-
mit or inherit property at death was neither a natural right nor was it 
constitutionally protected.”21 In the landmark case of Hodel v. Irving, 
however, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the ability to transmit 
property at death was a constitutionally protected property right akin to 
the right to exclude.22 While Hodel essentially afforded constitutional 
                                                                                                                      
concept of legitim provided “the forced share of a decedent’s estate from which the de-
ceased cannot disinherit his children without justification,” a concept that was not adopted 
by the United States. Id. at 381 n.33. 
19 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries *11–12 (“A man’s children or nearest rela-
tions are usually about him on his death-bed, and are the earliest witnesses of his decease. 
They became therefore generally the next immediate occupants, till at length, in process 
of time, this frequent usage ripened into general law.”). Blackstone also notes, however: 
While property continued only for life, testaments were useless and unknown; 
and, when it became inheritable, the inheritance was long indefeasible, and 
the children or heirs at law were incapable of exclusion by will. Till at length 
it was found, that so strict a rule of inheritance made heirs disobedient and 
headstrong, defrauded creditors of their just debts, and prevented many prov-
ident fathers from dividing or charging their estates as the exigence of their 
families required. This introduced pretty generally the right of disposing of 
one’s property, or a part of it, by testament . . . . 
Id. at *12. 
20 See Brashier, supra note 3, at 1 n.3; Dayan, supra note 18, at 382. 
21 See Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556, 562 (1942) (“Rights of succession to the 
property of a deceased, whether by will or by intestacy, are of statutory creation, and the 
dead hand rules succession only by sufferance.”); Dukeminier et al., supra note 1, at 3. 
22 See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987); Dukeminier et al., supra note 1, at 10. 
At issue in Hodel was the Indian Land Consolidation Act of 1983, which provided that par-
cels of land below a certain size and value would escheat to the tribe at the death of the 
owner. 481 U.S. at 709. Thus, the property owner was unable to pass on his land at death. 
Id. at 716. The Court unanimously held that the Act totally abrogated the right to pass on 
property, which amounted to a taking under the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 717. The statute 
was unconstitutional because it failed to provide compensation for this taking. See id. at 
717–18. One commentator argues: “It should be understood that the Supreme Court’s 
constitutional protection of the right of disposition in Hodel v. Irving is akin to declaring 
‘dead hand control’ of property a natural right. Thus, Irving is potentially revolutionary.” 
Ronald Chester, Essay: Is the Right to Devise Property Constitutionally Protected?—The Strange 
Case of Hodel v. Irving, 24 Sw. U. L. Rev. 1195, 1199 (1995). “Dead hand control” refers to 
the ability of a person to use wealth to influence others’ behavior after death. See Duke-
minier et al., supra note 1, at 27. 
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protection to the right to pass on property at death, it did not prescribe 
any details as to what the right to devise or inherit entails.23 
 While the right to pass on property at death (either through intes-
tate succession or by the use of a will) is constitutionally protected, it is 
clear that there is no right to inherit.24 The case of Shapira v. Union Na-
tional Bank demonstrates that courts are willing to uphold restrictive 
provisions in wills because a child has no right to inherit.25 In Shapira, 
the testator’s will contained a provision that stipulated that his son could 
receive his inheritance only if he married a Jewish girl within seven years 
of testator’s death.26 The testator’s son brought suit, arguing that the will 
provision at issue violated his constitutional right to marry and was 
against public policy.27 Finding against the son, the court upheld the will 
and held that there is no natural or constitutionally protected right to 
inherit.28 Thus, Shapira adds an important wrinkle to the constitutionally 
protected right to transmit property at death guaranteed by Hodel— 
there is no parallel constitutionally protected right to inherit.29 
A. Why Is Freedom of Testation So Important in the United States? 
 The lack of legislative protection against disinheritance in the 
United States is a salient indicator of the value America places on testa-
mentary freedom.30 While states will not allow a surviving spouse to be 
completely disinherited, a surviving child may be disinherited in every 
state except Louisiana.31 An examination of the various reasons parents 
disinherit their children sheds light upon whether freedom of testation 
can be defended in this context in light of the limits placed upon testa-
mentary freedom in the context of spousal support.32 
 One of the most persuasive arguments for maintaining the Ameri-
can system of testamentary freedom is that parents typically do fulfill 
their moral and financial obligations to their children (and to the 
                                                                                                                      
23 See Hodel, 481 U.S. at 717–18. 
24 See id.; Shapira v. Union Nat’l Bank, 315 N.E.2d 825, 828 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1974). 
25 See Shapira, 315 N.E.2d at 828. 
26 See id. at 826. The will further stipulated that the Jewish girl must have two Jewish 
parents. See id. 
27 See id. at 827, 829. 
28 See id. at 828 (holding that “the right to receive property by will is a creature of the 
law, and is not a natural right or one guaranteed or protected by . . . the United States 
constitution.”). 
29 See Hodel, 481 U.S. at 717–18; Shapira, 315 N.E.2d at 828. 
30 See Brashier, supra note 3, at 1; Brennan, supra note 2, at 134. 
31 See Batts, supra note 5, at 1198–99; Brashier, supra note 3, at 1. 
32 See Batts, supra note 5, at 1199; Brashier, supra note 3, at 7. 
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state).33 Thus, some might argue that there is no need to enact legisla-
tion protecting children from disinheritance.34 
 Notwithstanding the fact that most parents do in fact provide for 
their minor children, there are a number of acceptable reasons they 
may intentionally disinherit their children.35 In some circumstances, 
parents choose to disinherit their children, not out of lack of love or 
concern, but because they believe disinheritance is in the best interest 
of the child.36 Additionally, many testators (particularly older testators 
with moderate estates) want to devise their entire estate to a surviving 
spouse.37 In the case where a couple has minor children, the testator 
may leave his or her entire estate to the surviving spouse with the ex-
pectation that the surviving spouse will care for the surviving minor 
children, thus providing indirect support for the minor children.38 In 
the case of an older testator with adult children, the decedent may feel 
that the surviving spouse has a greater need for financial support.39 
 While these justifications for disinheritance are not unreasonable 
or without merit, their underlying rationale is most applicable to the 
disinheritance of adult children.40 Minor children, who are unable to 
                                                                                                                      
33 See Brashier, supra note 3, at 7. 
34 See id. 
35 See id. 
36 See id. (“[S]ome parents hold an altruistic belief that total disinheritance of one’s 
child forces that child to become a more fully self-actualized individual and contributing 
member of society.”). Wealthy testators frequently espouse this rationale when they are 
faced with the decision of whether to provide for their adult children. See id. at 7–8. In 
these instances, “these testator parents are convinced that both their child and society will 
be better off if the child is not allowed to ride the coattails of inherited wealth.” Id. at 8. 
37 See Dukeminier et al., supra note 1, at 75; Brashier, supra note 3, at 8. 
38 See Dukeminier et al., supra note 1, at 76 (“[S]tudies of estates with minor children 
show [leaving the entire estate to the surviving spouse to the exclusion of the children] to 
be the usual practice of those leaving wills.”). The UPC intestacy statute also follows this 
common practice. See Unif. Probate Code § 2-102(1) (amended 1993) (providing that, if 
all the decedent’s children are also children of the surviving spouse, and the surviving 
spouse has no other children, the surviving spouse takes the entire estate to the exclusion 
of the decedent’s children); see also Brennan, supra note 2, at 131. The protection afforded 
to minor children is limited in its effect when a testator leaves his or her entire estate to 
the surviving spouse because it “requires both a surviving spouse and a nuclear family. In 
instances where the parents are not married, or when there is only one parent surviving, 
that ‘fall back’ protection is gone.” Id. 
39 See Brashier, supra note 3, at 8 (“With life expectancies and costs of elder care in-
creasing, the testator spouse may feel that most, if not all, of his estate should be devised to 
the surviving spouse.”). 
40 See id. at 7–9 (discussing reasons why a testator might disinherit his or her children 
and explaining why these reasons are more readily applicable to the disinheritance of 
adult children). 
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care for themselves, often do not warrant intentional disinheritance 
and are thus in need of protection against arbitrary disinheritance.41 
 Moreover, some parents may intentionally disinherit their children 
for reasons that many would find morally reprehensible.42 In the in-
creasingly common case of non-nuclear families, parents may feel de-
tached from their biological children, particularly when they have cre-
ated new families.43 In addition, parents may disinherit their children 
out of anger or spite for the custodial parent or child.44 
 In order to contextualize the United States’ adherence to the ideal 
of testamentary freedom, it is useful to explore some alternate systems 
that require parents to provide for their children at death.45 
B. Alternatives to the United States’ Allowance of Disinheritance:  
Forced Heirship and Family Maintenance Statutes 
1. Forced Heirship 
 Forced heirship provisions are typically found in the Scandinavian 
countries, in many civil law countries, and in Louisiana.46 Forced heir-
ship involves an allocation of a portion or percentage of the decedent’s 
estate, dictated by statute, to the decedent’s children.47 
 Louisiana, the sole U.S. state to require parents to provide for their 
children at death, has adopted a forced heirship approach.48 The Lou-
isiana forced share (legitime) is derived from French law, and protects 
                                                                                                                      
41 See id. at 8 (“[D]isinheritance of one’s adult children is much less objectionable than 
disinheritance of one’s minor children who are as yet incompetent to provide for them-
selves.”). 
42 See id. at 9. 
43 See id. at 9–10. 
44 See Brashier, supra note 3, at 9–10. 
45 See Batts, supra note 5, at 1211, 1213 (discussing forced heirship provisions and fam-
ily maintenance statutes). 
46 Id. at 1211. Countries that employ the forced heirship approach include Belgium, 
Brazil, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Lebanon, Mexico, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Scotland, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, 
Ukraine, Venezuela, and Uruguay. York, supra note 15, at 865 n.17. 
47 Batts, supra note 5, at 1211. 
48 See La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 1493(A)(2008). The statute provides: 
Forced heirs are descendants of the first degree who, at the time of the death 
of the decedent, are twenty-three years of age or younger or descendants of 
the first degree of any age who, because of mental incapacity or physical in-
firmity, are permanently incapable of taking care of their persons or adminis-
tering their estates at the time of the death of the decedent. 
Id.; Brashier, supra note 3, at 1. 
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against the disinheritance of children under twenty-three years of age 
as well as the mentally and physically disabled, regardless of age.49 The 
Louisiana forced share is not without its limitations—a child may be 
disinherited for “just cause.”50 This “just cause” provision allows parents 
to disinherit children who have acted in a way so as not to “deserve” 
their inheritance.51 
 There are many benefits to forced heirship provisions.52 Most im-
portantly, they guarantee that the needs of children (particularly minor 
children) are met, whenever possible, by their parents rather than by 
the state.53 Forced heirship statutes, like child support statutes, require 
that parents provide for their children at death as in life.54 Thus, the 
state’s interest in ensuring that children do not needlessly become 
wards of the state is furthered by forced heirship provisions.55 More 
generally, the statutes reflect a societal feeling that it is natural for chil-
                                                                                                                      
49 La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 1493; Dukeminier et al., supra note 1, at 521. Prior to 
1989, the Louisiana forced share extended to all children, regardless of age or need. Batts, 
supra note 5, at 1211. 
50 La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 1621(A). The statute provides: 
A parent has just cause to disinherit a child if: 
(1) The child has raised his hand to strike a parent, or has actually struck a 
parent; but a mere threat is not sufficient. 
(2) The child has been guilty, towards a parent, of cruel treatment, crime, or 
grievous injury. 
(3) The child has attempted to take the life of a parent. 
(4) The child, without any reasonable basis, has accused a parent of commit-
ting a crime for which the law provides that the punishment could be life im-
prisonment or death. 
(5) The child has used any act of violence or coercion to hinder a parent 
from making a testament. 
(6) The child, being a minor, has married without the consent of the parent. 
(7) The child has been convicted of a crime for which the law provides that 
the punishment could be life imprisonment or death. 
(8) The child, after attaining the age of majority and knowing how to contact 
the parent, has failed to communicate with the parent without just cause for a 
period of two years, unless the child was on active duty in any of the military 
forces of the United States at the time. 
Id. 
51 See id. 
52 See Batts, supra note 5, at 1223–25. 
53 See id. at 1223 (noting that providing for children’s needs not only closely relates to 
the “‘moral’ obligation of a living parent to ‘support, maintain, educate, and provide for 
the future of his children’” but is also a compelling interest of the state (quoting Cynthia 
A. Samuel et al., Successions and Donations, 45 La. L. Rev. 575, 594 (1984))). 
54 See id. at 1211; Brashier, supra note 3, at 5–7. 
55 See Batts, supra note 5, at 1211; Brashier, supra note 3, at 5–7. 
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dren to expect an inheritance from their parents.56 Many commenta-
tors posit that forced heirship promotes family bonding, cohesiveness, 
stability, responsibility, identity, and belonging, which are attributes that 
any rational society would seek to encourage.57 
 Finally, the procedural simplicity of forced heirship is an important 
benefit of the system.58 Because the application of the statute is auto-
matic, judicial resources are not expended as they are in a family main-
tenance system.59 The ease of application is also beneficial for estate 
planning purposes.60 Because parents are aware of the statutory forced 
share, they can create testamentary plans that are less likely to be struck 
down by courts using judicial doctrines in order to provide for disinher-
ited children.61 
 The most compelling drawback of forced heirship is the rigidity 
required in its application.62 Forced heirship statutes are typically ap-
plied without regard for the size of the estate or the age, level of need, 
or independence of the children.63 Additionally, forced heirship provi-
sions essentially pit the rights of the surviving spouse against the rights 
of the surviving children, and may depart from what the average testa-
tor would desire.64 Finally, some commentators argue that guaranteed 
inheritance, which is the result of forced heirship, might cause heirs to 
                                                                                                                      
56 See Batts, supra note 5, at 1224 (pointing out that the natural expectation of an in-
heritance is “entrenched in our laws of intestacy, yet totally discarded when in tension with 
testamentary freedom”). 
57 See id. at 1222, 1225. 
58 See id. at 1225; infra Part I.B.2. 
59 See Batts, supra note 5, at 1213–14; 1225; infra Part I.B.2. 
60 See Batts, supra note 5, at 1227. 
61 See Dukeminier et al., supra note 1, at 520; Batts, supra note 5, at 1225, 1227 
(“[E]state planners could take advantage of the known quantity aspect of forced heirship 
in planning the estate.”); Ray D. Madoff, Unmasking Undue Influence, 81 Minn. L. Rev. 571, 
577 (1997). 
62 See Batts, supra note 5, at 1226. 
63 See id. (“Forced heirship formalizes the ancient familial distribution of the dece-
dent’s estate to the decedent’s kin; the emphasis is on family, not individual need.”). 
64 See Dukeminier et al., supra note 1, at 75 (“[W]hen there are no children from a 
prior marriage, most persons want everything to go to the surviving spouse, thus excluding 
parents and siblings—and children. This preference is particularly strong among persons 
with moderate estates . . . .”); Batts, supra note 5, at 1226 (“Most of those interviewed 
would leave most, if not all, of small estates to the surviving spouse only, contrary to the 
property distribution of most intestacy laws between surviving spouse and children. This 
preference did not continue when there were remarriages, adult children, or children of 
prior marriages.”) (footnote omitted). It is in these fractured families where protection 
against disinheritance is needed most. See Brashier, supra note 3, at 3. 
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become lazy and unmotivated because they know they will ultimately 
inherit from their parents.65 
2. Family Maintenance Statutes 
 Another common international practice that protects children’s 
inheritance is the family maintenance system, which is present in many 
common law countries.66 Under this system, children who are omitted 
from a parent’s will may seek discretionary judicial intervention in or-
der to obtain a portion of the deceased parent’s estate.67 Thus, unlike 
forced heirship provisions, family maintenance systems “allow[] flexibil-
ity in providing for the needs of heirs.”68 
 The primary benefit of the family maintenance system lies in its 
elasticity, which allows judges to examine the age, need, and independ-
ence of children in order to determine the appropriate level of inheri-
tance.69 The Australian case of Lambeff v. Farmers Co-operative Executors 
and Trustees Ltd. provides an excellent example of this flexibility.70 
There, the court provided for the adult daughter of the testator, whom 
he disinherited by devising his entire estate in equal parts to his two 
                                                                                                                      
65 See Batts, supra note 5, at 1221 (explaining that a perceived disadvantage of guaran-
teed inheritance is that it may “cause heirs to cease to work and so reduce . . . the total 
wealth of the country”). 
66 See id. at 1211. Countries that have adopted family maintenance systems include 
England, Wales, New Zealand, Australia, and some parts of Canada. Joshua C. Tate, Care-
giving and the Case for Testamentary Freedom, 42 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 129, 140 (2008). 
67 See Batts, supra note 5, at 1213–14. 
68 See York, supra note 15, at 870. New Zealand has adopted a quintessential example of 
a family maintenance statute. See Batts, supra note 5, at 1214. The New Zealand Family 
Protection Act allows any child of the deceased (in addition to other categories of pro-
tected claimants) to petition the court for intervention to provide for his or her needs. See 
id. The statute provides: 
If any person (referred to in this Act as the deceased) dies, whether testate or 
intestate, and in terms of his or her will or as a result of his or her intestacy 
adequate provision is not available from his or her estate for the proper main-
tenance and support of the persons by whom or on whose behalf application 
may be made under this Act, the Court may, at its discretion on application so 
made, order that any provision the Court thinks fit be made out of the de-
ceased’s estate for all or any of those persons. 
Family Protection Act 1955 No 88 (N.Z.). 
69 See Frances H. Foster, Linking Support and Inheritance: A New Model from China, 1999 
Wis. L. Rev. 1199, 1213–14 (“Proponents laud the model’s flexibility, which allows estate 
distribution to be ‘tailored to individual need’ and ‘evolving lifestyles.’”) (footnote omit-
ted). 
70 See Lambeff v. Farmers Coop. Ex’rs & Trs. Ltd. (1991) 56 SASR 323, 324–26 (Austl.). 
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adult sons.71 In determining the appropriate division of the estate, the 
court considered the relative job security, salary, property ownership, 
and family situation of the three children of the deceased.72 Ultimately, 
although the plaintiff was in a better financial situation than her half-
brothers, the court found that she was deserving of a portion of her 
father’s estate.73 
 The flexibility inherent in the family maintenance system speaks to 
the natural desire to protect children in need while allowing for some 
degree of testamentary freedom.74 Thus, proponents of the family 
maintenance model praise its protection of family members, particu-
larly children, with the least possible interference with testamentary 
freedom.75 
 The unfortunate drawback of the family maintenance system is 
that, because of the discretionary nature of the system, there is the dis-
tinct possibility of inconsistent results. 76 Additionally, its flexibility can 
only be achieved by expending substantial resources.77 Because each 
                                                                                                                      
71 See id. at 324, 328. 
72 See id. at 324–26. 
73 See id. at 324–26, 328. The court held: 
The plaintiff was abandoned by the deceased at the age of 10, and had no sup-
port from him thereafter. She later made efforts to befriend her father. She has 
done nothing to disentitle herself. It is true that she has acquitted herself rea-
sonable well in life without her father’s support, but I think she would have 
done better with proper support for her advancement in life. I think her claim 
succeeds, but in all the circumstances the provision should be modest. I order 
that the defendants pay her a legacy of $20,000 out of the estate. 
Id. at 328. 
74 See Batts, supra note 5, at 1215. Professor Batts explains that the New Zealand Family 
Protection Act elevates “certain aspects of the parent-child bond over certain aspects of 
testamentary freedom. When there is need on the part of a dependent, that need is ad-
dressed, testamentary wishes notwithstanding; when there is no need, testamentary wishes 
are followed.” Id. 
75 See id.; Foster, supra note 69, at 1214 (noting that proponents appreciate that 
“[u]nlike the alternative foreign and U.S. entitlement-based systems[,] . . . the family 
maintenance scheme ‘does not apply automatically’ but rather comes into play only upon 
petition by qualifying ‘aggrieved claimants’”) (footnote omitted). 
76 See Foster, supra note 69, at 1215. Critics argue that “the family maintenance model 
would introduce such complexity and unpredictability into the U.S. probate process that it 
would undermine estate planning and obstruct simple, orderly transfer of property rights.” 
Id. But see Joseph Dainow, Restricted Testation in New Zealand, Australia and Canada, 36 Mich. 
L. Rev. 1107, 1111 (1938) (noting that, in the application of New Zealand’s family mainte-
nance statute, “the general principles of construction have been consistent, and despite 
the extreme latitude of the court’s discretion, the decisions have not been conflicting”) 
(footnote omitted). 
77 See Foster, supra note 69, at 1215 (explaining that critics of family maintenance sys-
tems find that “the costs of a discretionary redistribution system are . . . unacceptable”). 
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claim is decided on a case-by-case basis, the judicial system is heavily 
taxed.78 Finally, because a lawsuit must be initiated in order to amend 
the testator’s plan of disposition, family maintenance systems present 
the possibility of increased litigation and familial discord.79 As some 
commentators have noted, the American propensity toward litigation 
may make the family maintenance system too burdensome and un-
workable in the United States.80 
II. Indirect Judicial Protections Against the  
Disinheritance of Children 
 Although there is no formal protection against disinheritance in 
forty-nine American states, courts have made use of a number of doc-
trines in order to “remedy” testamentary plans that fail to provide for 
children.81 Some of the doctrines that have been used to amend wills in 
order to provide for disinherited children include undue influence, 
mental capacity, and fraud.82 These doctrines are widely and flexibly 
                                                                                                                      
78 See Batts, supra note 5, at 1216; Foster, supra note 69, at 1215. 
79 See Batts, supra note 5, at 1216; Foster, supra note 70, at 1215 (noting concerns that a 
family maintenance system in the United States would “‘promote litigation,’ increase ‘in-
formation and administrative costs,’ and ‘deplete estates.’”) (footnotes omitted). 
80 See, e.g., Batts, supra note 5, at 1216 (“The fortune of New Zealand and England in 
avoiding a deluge of litigation from the family maintenance system may not repeat here, of 
course, where litigation may be the ‘American way.’”); Foster, supra note 69, at 1215 (not-
ing that the U.S. probate system is “comprised of multiple, local probate courts, staffed 
often by lay judges chosen on the basis of politics rather than merit,” and making it un-
suitable to place such power in the hands of these courts) (footnotes omitted). 
81 See Dukeminier et al., supra note 1, at 520; Madoff, supra note 61, at 611. Professor 
Madoff argues that: 
[T]he undue influence doctrine dictates that unless the family has done 
something to “deserve” disinheritance, the bulk of a person’s property should 
be left to his or her spouse and blood relatives. . . . If the bequest fails to meet 
the proscribed norms, the will is set aside and the property passes under the 
laws of intestacy. . . . Thus, the impact of the undue influence doctrine is to 
act as a form of forced heirship. 
Madoff, supra note 61, at 611. 
82 See Dukeminier et al., supra note 1, at 520. In order to be competent to make a 
will: 
[T]he testator must be an adult . . . and “must be capable of knowing and 
understanding in a general way [1] the nature and extent of his or her prop-
erty, [2] the natural objects of his or her bounty, and [3] the disposition that 
he or she is making of that property, and must also be capable of [4] relating 
these elements to one another and forming an orderly desire regarding the 
disposition of the property.” 
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used to amend testamentary plans that disinherit children.83 Thus, it 
appears that while the laws in the United States favor testamentary free-
dom, many courts unofficially attempt to implement “natural” plans of 
disposition (i.e. plans that provide for blood relatives) against the stated 
intent of the testator by employing these remedial doctrines.84 
A. The Undue Influence Doctrine 
 Although judicial opinions consistently state that the court’s pri-
mary purpose is to effectuate testator intent, courts apply doctrines 
such as undue influence in a manner that is contrary to this stated pur-
                                                                                                                      
Id. at 159 (quoting Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Wills and Other Donative Trans-
fers § 8.1(b) (2003)). In order for there to be undue influence in the eyes of the law, there 
must be coercion: “It is only when the will of the person who becomes a testator is coerced 
into doing that which he or she does not desire to do, that it is undue influence.” Id. at 180. 
In the absence of direct evidence of undue influence, courts will often allow circumstantial 
evidence to prove that: “(1) the donor was susceptible to undue influence, (2) the alleged 
wrongdoer had an opportunity to exert undue influence, (3) the alleged wrongdoer had a 
disposition to exert undue influence, and (4) there was a result appearing to be the effect of 
the undue influence.” Id. at 181–82. Fraud occurs “where the testator is deceived by a delib-
erate misrepresentation and does that which he would not have done had the misrepresenta-
tion not been made.” Id. at 207. The Restatement (Third) of Property defines undue influence in 
the following way: “A donative transfer is procured by undue influence if the wrongdoer 
exerted such influence over the donor that it overcame the donor’s free will and caused the 
donor to make a donative transfer that the donor would not otherwise have made.” Re-
statement (Third) of Prop.: Wills and Other Donative Transfers § 8.3(b) (2003). 
83 See Dukeminier et al., supra note 1, at 520. The authors note: 
A will disinheriting a child virtually invites a will contest. . . . “[T]estamentary 
capacity,” “undue influence,” and “fraud” are subtle and elastic concepts that 
judges and juries can use to rewrite the testator’s distribute plan in order to 
“do justice.” In contests by disinherited children, judges and juries are fre-
quently influenced by their sympathies for the children. 
Id. 
84 See Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 Ariz. L. Rev. 235, 236 
(1996). Professor Leslie notes: 
Notwithstanding frequent declarations to the contrary, many courts are as 
committed to ensuring that testators devise their estates in accordance with 
prevailing normative views as they are to effectuating testamentary intent. 
Those courts impose upon testators a duty to provide for those to whom the 
court views as having a superior moral claim to the testator’s assets, usually a 
financially dependent spouse or persons related by blood to the testator. Wills 
that fail to provide for those individuals typically are upheld only if the will’s 
proponent can convince the fact-finder that the testator’s deviation from 
normative values is morally justifiable. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
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pose.85 Thus, the theoretical importance of testamentary freedom is 
perhaps disingenuous upon careful study of judicial opinions.86 
 Professor Melanie Leslie conducted a study that examined all cases 
that considered undue influence in their review over a randomly cho-
sen five-year period.87 Her study showed that many courts, when “con-
fronted with wills that disinherited family members in favor of non-
family members,” upheld findings of undue influence, even in the ab-
sence of substantial evidence.88 Professor Leslie found that these court 
opinions rely heavily on the unnatural nature of a bequest to a non-
family member, particularly when the testator did nothing to explain 
the disinheritance.89 Professor Leslie’s study provides strong evidence 
that courts favor “natural” dispositions to family members over disposi-
tions to non-family members, even in the face of a testator’s clear intent 
to disinherit.90 
B. Undue Influence at Work: Case Studies 
 Gaines v. Frawley provides an excellent example of a court finding 
undue influence in the face of an “unnatural” disposition despite the 
testator’s clear intent.91 There, Lois Frawley left her entire estate to her 
live-in boyfriend, Edward Gaines, to the exclusion of her two adult 
sons.92 The court found that Frawley’s boyfriend exerted undue influ-
ence, even though there were “few of the traditional indicia of undue 
                                                                                                                      
85 See id. at 243–44. Professor Leslie studied all reported cases that applied the undue 
influence doctrine within a five-year period and found that courts “were much more likely 
to honor testamentary intent when the will provided for family members as opposed to 
non-relatives.” Id. 
86 See id. at 236. 
87 See id. at 243. Professor Leslie reviewed a total of 160 cases, which she located by util-
izing the Westlaw topic and key numbers, for the period between December 31, 1984 and 
January 1, 1990. See id. & n.41. 
88 See id. at 245 (“[C]ourts implicitly relieved the contestant of the burden of proof, 
shifting the burden to the will’s beneficiary.”). 
89 See Leslie, supra note 84, at 245. Specifically, Professor Leslie illustrates that, when 
faced with a will contest in which the testator disinherited a family member in favor of a 
non-family member, courts will “implicitly break the rule placing the burden of proof on 
contestants . . . .” Id. at 246. Additionally, Leslie notes that courts consider the “moral wor-
thiness” of the family members, and are more likely to find undue influence when the 
disinherited family member has done nothing to “deserve” disinheritance. See id. 
90 See id. at 246 (“[T]he court often substituted its judgment for the judgment of the 
testator; the issue became not whether the document represented the testator’s intent, but 
whether the testator’s intentions offended the courts’ sense of justice or morality.”). 
91 See Gaines v. Frawley, 739 S.W.2d 950, 955 (Tex. App. 1987). 
92 Id. at 951–52. 
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influence.”93 As evidence of her susceptibility to influence, the court 
relied on the fact that Frawley had emphysema and cancer, even 
though neither illness provided evidence of weakened mental capac-
ity.94 The court then turned to the question of whether Gaines’ influ-
ence was undue, and relied on evidence that the couple drank heavily 
and had a tempestuous and illicit relationship—Gaines was still mar-
ried to his seventh wife when he moved in with Frawley.95 Finally, the 
court turned to the relationship between Frawley and her sons, finding 
that the sons had a good relationship with their mother and visited her 
often.96 This positive relationship between Frawley and her sons was 
used as evidence of the unnatural nature and unjust result of her tes-
tamentary disposition.97 The court ultimately found that Frawley’s boy-
friend had unduly influenced her, despite the lack of evidence that 
Gaines had “actively sought to influence” Frawley’s will.98 
 Gaines provides a quintessential example of how courts will often 
loosen their evidentiary standards and shift burdens of proof in order 
to remedy what they feel are unjust, unnatural dispositions that disin-
herit family members.99 The application of doctrines such as undue 
influence and fraud is justified overtly as an attempt to protect a testa-
tor’s right to dispose of his or her property as he or she sees fit.100 Cases 
                                                                                                                      
93 See id. at 955; Leslie, supra note 84, at 250. Additionally, the Restatement (Third) of Prop-
erty provides a nonexhaustive list of suspicious circumstances that may lead to an inference of 
undue influence, few of which were found in Gaines. See 739 S.W.2d at 953–55; Restatement 
(Third) of Prop.: Wills and other Donative Transfers § 8.3 cmt. h (2003). 
94 See Gaines, 739 S.W.2d at 953; Leslie, supra note 84, at 250 (noting that “[t]here was 
no evidence . . . of weakened mental capacity or incoherence. . .” in Gaines). 
95 See Gaines, 739 S.W.2d at 951–54; Leslie, supra note 84, at 251 (“[T]he court empha-
sized the illicit nature of the relationship between testator and beneficiary and the seem-
ingly repulsive personality of the beneficiary.”). 
96 See Gaines, 739 S.W.2d at 954–55. 
97 See id. at 955; Leslie, supra note 84, at 252 (“[T]he court stressed what it viewed as 
the injustice of the will provisions, emphasizing that the sons had gotten along well with 
their mother and had been frequent visitors to her home.”). 
98 See Gaines, 739 S.W.2d at 955; Leslie, supra note 84, at 251. Despite the lack of con-
crete evidence that would prove that Frawley was susceptible to influence or that her boy-
friend in fact did seek to influence the provisions of Frawley’s will, the court stated: 
The above circumstances considered with evidence of Mrs. Frawley being 
weakened and impaired, in addition to testimony showing her fear of appel-
lant, is sufficient to justify a jury in determining her will was unnatural in its 
terms. The necessary elements of undue influence by appellant over testatrix 
are supported by tangible evidence. 
See Gaines, 739 S.W.2d at 955. 
99 See Gaines, 739 S.W.2d at 955; Leslie, supra note 84, at 245–46. 
100 See Madoff, supra note 61, at 576. Professor Madoff provides the following example: 
“[I]f an aged testator leaves everything to his nurse of one month, disinheriting his family, 
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such as Gaines demonstrate, however, that, rather than furthering tes-
tamentary freedom, doctrines such as undue influence are actually 
used to impose testamentary norms, even in the face of unambiguous 
testamentary intent.101 In fact, because the doctrine of undue influence 
is often used to impose testamentary norms (which are in turn suscep-
tible to societal norms), the application of the doctrine may not take 
into account “alternative” lifestyles, and cases applying the doctrine 
may become outdated as social norms evolve.102 Thus, the doctrine is 
somewhat unstable and should not be relied upon to protect disinher-
ited children.103 
                                                                                                                      
a court’s finding of undue influence will be justified on the basis that the will does not 
represent the testator’s true wishes.” Id. 
101 See Gaines, 739 S.W.2d 955; Madoff, supra note 61, at 576 (“[R]ather than furthering 
freedom of testation, the undue influence doctrine denies freedom of testation for people 
who deviate from judicially imposed testamentary norms—in particular, the norm that 
people should provide for their families.”). 
102 See In re Will of Kaufmann, 247 N.Y.S.2d 664, 685, 689 (App. Div. 1964), aff’d, 205 
N.E.2d 864 (N.Y. 1965). In this case, Robert D. Kaufmann, a wealthy man who sought an 
independent life away from his family, met Walter Weiss, a man who became Kaufmann’s 
financial advisor, business consultant, and romantic partner—the two men became ex-
tremely close and purchased a home together. See id. at 666–67, 683; Madoff, supra note 61 
at 592. Kaufmann executed wills in successive years, each year increasing Weiss’s share of 
Kaufmann’s estate. See Kaufmann, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 667, 671; Madoff, supra note 61, at 594–
95. Because homosexuality was a less acceptable lifestyle in 1964 when the case was de-
cided, the Court found undue influence and set aside the bequest to Weiss, despite Kauf-
mann’s clear intentions. See Kaufmann, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 685–86; Madoff, supra note 61, at 
598. Kaufmann sent a letter to his family along with his amended will, which left “a sizeable 
portion” of his property to Weiss. Kaufmann, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 671. The letter stated: 
 Walter gave me the courage to start something which slowly but eventually 
permitted me to supply for myself everything my life had heretofore lacked: 
an outlet for my long-latent but strong creative ability in painting . . . a bal-
anced, healthy sex life which before had been spotty, furtive and destructive; 
an ability to reorientate myself to actual life and to face it calmly and realisti-
cally. All of this adds up to Peace of Mind. . . . 
 I am eternally grateful to my dearest friend—best pal, Walter A. Weiss. 
What could be more wonderful than a fruitful, contented life and who more 
deserving of gratitude now, in the form of an inheritance, than the person 
who helped most in securing that life? I cannot believe my family could be 
anything else but glad and happy for my own comfortable self-determination 
and contentment and equally grateful to the friend who made it possible. 
Id. at 671. The court found “[t]he emotional base” reflected in the letter to be “gratitude 
utterly unreal, highly exaggerated and pitched to a state of fervor and ecstasy.” Id. at 674. 
103 See Chester, supra note 7, at 28; Madoff, supra note 61, at 598. Professor Madoff ex-
plains: 
It would be easy to dismiss Kaufmann as just another example of judicial ho-
mophobia from an era in which courts and society at large were openly pre-
judiced against homosexual relationships. However, to categorize this case as 
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 To highlight the inadequacy of reliance on the undue influence 
doctrine to protect minor children against disinheritance, it is useful to 
explore a case where a court did not apply the doctrine despite the 
clear presence of traditional indicia of undue influence.104 In Lipper v. 
Weslow, Sophie Block left a will devising the entirety of her estate to two 
of her children, consequently disinheriting her three grandchildren 
(the children of Block’s deceased first child).105 The will in question 
was prepared by one of the beneficiaries of the will (Block’s son), and 
contained a lengthy explanation as to why Block was disinheriting her 
grandchildren.106 The court focused on the written intention of the 
testator, overlooking a number of factors in finding that there was no 
undue influence: Block was eighty-one years of age when she executed 
the will, there was evidence that the testator’s son who prepared the will 
bore malice toward the deceased son and was in a position to influence 
the testator, and there was evidence that the stated reasons for disinher-
iting Block’s grandchildren were untrue.107 Despite the existence of a 
                                                                                                                      
an aberration, a misapplication of the undue influence doctrine, is to miss 
the more significant lesson that this case offers. What is notable about the 
Kaufmann decision is that it rests on firm ground under the standard doc-
trinal undue influence analysis. Changing mores have given us the opportu-
nity to see this doctrine for what it is: an imposition of societal norms as to 
appropriate testamentary behavior. 
Madoff, supra note 61, at 598 (footnote omitted); see also In re Estate of Sarabia, 270 Cal. 
Rptr. 560, 566 (Ct. App. 1990) (upholding a jury finding of no undue influence). The facts 
of Sarabia are substantially similar to those in Kaufmann—the similarities of the facts cou-
pled with the disparate findings of undue influence highlight the inconsistent application 
of the doctrine. See Sarabia, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 561–62, 564–65; Kaufmann, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 
485–86. 
104 See Lipper v. Weslow, 369 S.W.2d 698, 701, 703 (Tex. App. 1963); Chester, supra note 
7, at 28. 
105 See Lipper, 369 S.W.2d at 699. 
106 See id. at 699, 700–01. The will explained that Block was disinheriting her grand-
children because they had “shown a most unfriendly and distant attitude towards [her].” 
See id. at 700. She further stated that she had not seen her grandchildren in several years, 
and that her daughter-in-law (the wife of her deceased son) had contacted Block very in-
frequently after her son’s death (flowers on Christmas and a few greeting cards). Id. at 
700–01. 
107 See id. at 701. The Court noted: 
There is evidence that defendant Lipper bore malice against his dead half 
brother. He lived next door to testatrix, and had a key to her house. The will 
was not read to testatrix prior to the time she signed same, and she had no 
discussion with anyone at the time she executed it. There is evidence that the 
recitations in the will that Bernice Weslow [testator’s daughter-in-law] and her 
children were unfriendly, and never came about testatrix, were untrue. There 
is also evidence that the Weslows sent testatrix greeting cards and flowers 
from 1946 through 1954, more times than stated in the will. 
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confidential relationship between Block and her children and the sus-
picious circumstances, the court placed the burden on the will contest-
ants to prove undue influence and ultimately found against them.108 
 The many doctrines courts use to amend wills often militate against 
the disinheritance of children in the United States.109 As the above cases 
demonstrate, however, this remedy is imperfect, because the application 
of these judicial doctrines may be inconsistent and cannot be relied 
upon.110 In order to protect minor children from disinheritance and 
conserve state resources, the judicial inclination that deceased parents 
should provide for their children should be codified in order to ensure 
consistent results.111 While the reasoning of courts in utilizing doctrines 
such as undue influence to remedy disinheritance is sound, the preva-
lence of these doctrines indicates that legislatures should be attending 
to the underlying issue rather than allowing courts to decide each case 
on an ad hoc basis.112 
III. Legislation As the Best Means to Protect Minor  
Children from Disinheritance 
 The common judicial practice of reforming wills in order to pro-
vide for disinherited family members, while not codified, is practically 
similar to the family maintenance system because both allow for the 
flexible allocation of resources to disinherited children.113 The use of 
judicial doctrines to amend testamentary plans, however, is an inade-
quate substitute for a law that guarantees a forced share for children, or 
                                                                                                                      
Id. 
108 See id. at 703. 
109 See Madoff, supra note 61, at 577 (“[F]amily protectionism is built into the very fab-
ric of the undue influence doctrine. . . . The doctrine does not act to protect the intent of 
the testator, but rather to protect the testator’s biological family from disinheritance.”). 
110 See Kaufmann, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 685–86; Gaines, 739 S.W.2d at 955; Lipper, 369 S.W.2d 
at 703; Chester, supra note 7, at 28 (arguing that the protection afforded by judicial doc-
trines give some protection to children in the United States, but that the protection is 
“indirect, haphazard, and finally unsatisfactory”). 
111 See Brashier, supra note 3, at 7; Chester, supra note 7, at 28; Madoff, supra note 61, at 
598. 
112 See Chester, supra note 7, at 28; Madoff, supra note 61, at 598. 
113 See Dukeminier et al., supra note 1, at 520 (discussing the wide and flexible use of 
doctrines such as undue influence to amend testamentary plans); Foster, supra note 69, at 
1213–14 (discussing the flexibility of family maintenance systems that allow courts to 
amend testamentary dispositions on a case-by-case basis). Family maintenance statutes and 
judicial doctrines such as undue influence have in common that they give the judiciary the 
flexibility and discretion to amend testamentary plans. See Dukeminier et al., supra note 
1, at 520; Foster, supra note 69, at 1213–14. 
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for one that expressly gives courts the power to amend wills.114 In the 
absence of legislation, judicial decisions utilizing doctrines such as un-
due influence to amend wills run the risk of being arbitrary and incon-
sistent.115 The use of the undue influence doctrine provides a prime 
example of this inconsistency because the stated purpose of the doc-
trine deviates significantly from the ways in which courts utilize the doc-
trine.116 In short, indirect judicial protections against the disinheritance 
of minor children embody the same problems as family maintenance 
statutes—the application of the doctrine is too discretionary and too 
inconsistent.117 
 While most testators provide for their minor children either di-
rectly through a testamentary bequest or indirectly by leaving the en-
tirety of their estate to the surviving spouse, who is often the parent of 
the minor, the problem of the intentional disinheritance of minor chil-
dren is nevertheless important.118 
                                                                                                                      
114 See Dukeminier et al., supra note 1, at 510; Chester, supra note 7, at 28; Foster, su-
pra note 69, at 1213–14. 
115 See Chester, supra note 7, at 28; supra Part II.B. 
116 See Madoff, supra note 61, at 575–76 (explaining that the undue influence doctrine 
is understood as an attempt to protect testator’s right to freedom of testation, but in fact, 
the judiciary uses the doctrine to impose the testamentary norm that people should pro-
vide for their families); supra Part II.B. 
117 See Batts, supra note 5, at 1216; Chester, supra note 7, at 28; Foster, supra note 69, at 
1215. 
118 See Dukeminier et al., supra note 1, at 76; Jeffrey P. Rosenfeld, Will Contests: Lega-
cies of Social Change, in Inheritance and Wealth in America 173, 174 (Robert K. Miller, 
Jr. & Stephen J. McNamee eds., 1998) (explaining that disinheritance only occurs in fewer 
than three percent of probated estates). Rosenfeld warns, however, that “[w]ill contests are 
socially and economically significant events . . . . They can rupture and realign the social 
fabric of families, and keep millions of dollars tied up in litigation for years. . . . [They] 
often involve large estates, and can create decades of ill-will in families.” Rosenfeld, supra; 
see also Paul G. Haskell, Restraints Upon the Disinheritance of Family Members, in Death, Taxes 
and Family Property: Essays and American Assembly Report 105, 114–15 (Edward C. 
Halbach, Jr. ed., 1977). Professor Haskell cautions: 
There is no explanation for the failure to protect minor children from disin-
heritance . . . other than that such disinheritance rarely occurs. This is un-
doubtedly true, but the same can be said for all kinds of aberrational conduct 
which the law prohibits or punishes. Every moral obligation needs to have its 
legal counterpart. Moral obligations in the family support area do have legal 
counterparts in many respects, but the one inexplicable exception is the ab-
sence of any legal obligation to assure support for minor children in some 
manner after death. 
Id. 
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 As non-traditional families are becoming more common, disin-
heritance of non-custodial minor children is likely to increase as well.119 
Disinheritance will likely predominantly affect those children whose 
parents are divorced, those born out of wedlock, and particularly those 
children with a non-custodial parent who has started a new family.120 In 
these situations, money left to the surviving spouse is not money that is, 
in essence, indirectly left to the minor children.121 Additionally, these 
are the children who are more likely to be intentionally disinherited by 
their non-custodial parents.122 The law should not implicitly sanction 
this disproportionate treatment of children who, through no fault of 
their own, do not reside with both of their biological parents.123 
 Perhaps the most compelling argument for requiring parents to 
provide for their children at death is a moral one—parents are morally 
                                                                                                                      
119 See Brashier, supra note 3, at 9 (“[N]oncustodial parents appear particularly likely to 
disinherit their minor children.”); Ronald Chester, Should American Children Be Protected 
Against Disinheritance?, 32 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 405, 410 (1997) (“Increasingly, disin-
heritance involves families reconstituted after divorce and remarriage.”); see also Rosenfeld, 
supra note 118, at 177. Rosenfeld interviewed twenty-eight estate litigators and found that 
changes in family structure and the impact of divorce and remarriage accounted for 74.9% 
of the recent will contests in these attorneys’ caseloads. See Rosenfeld, supra note 118, at 
176, 177. 
120 See Brashier, supra note 3, at 9–10. The court in Kujawinski v. Kujawinski stated the 
problem as follows: 
[W]hile it is comparatively rare for a nondivorced parent to leave a spouse 
and their children out of a will, it is not so uncommon for a divorced parent 
to do so. A divorced parent may establish a new family which may command 
primary allegiance in a subsequent will. The well-being of children of a for-
mer marriage may seem more remote to a noncustodial parent than the well-
being of those children over whom that same parent has immediate care and 
custody. In addition, the divorced parent may harbor animosity toward a for-
mer spouse, which disposition might obscure the natural tendency to provide 
in a will for their mutual children. 
376 N.E.2d 1382, 1390–91 (Ill. 1978) (citation omitted); see also Batts, supra note 5, at 1200 
(“[T]he substantial fifty percent divorce rate and the frequent incidence of remarriage . . . 
often attenuates the child’s bond with one parent and leads to the increased possibility of 
disinheritance of children.”) (footnote omitted); Rosenfeld, supra note 118, at 179 (“[A]n 
estimated 1,300 stepfamilies are being formed every day . . . . More than 6 million children 
live with the biological mother and a stepfather; 740,000 live with the biological father and 
a stepmother.”). 
121 See Brennan, supra note 2, at 131. 
122 See Batts, supra note 5, at 1201 (“The possible alienation and disaffection of the 
noncustodial parent toward the child might result in disinheritance of the child who that 
parent never really knew.”). 
123 See Brashier, supra note 3, at 9–10, 11 (“Children of divorce and nonmarital chil-
dren are particularly likely to bear the brunt of disinheritance.”). 
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obligated to support their own children.124 This moral obligation to 
support one’s children is codified by law in child support statutes, but it 
also runs deeply through the veins of American society.125 While par-
ents are legally obligated to support their minor children during life, 
there exists no requirement that parents provide for their children at 
death, an incongruity that seems arbitrary and illogical.126 In fact, it 
may make more sense to require parents to provide for their children 
at death because a decedent has no use for money after death.127 
 Interestingly, child support is one of the few financial obligations 
that appears to disappear at death.128 For example, a testator’s creditors 
may make claims against his estate, demonstrating that all the testator’s 
financial responsibilities do not die along with him.129 This begs the 
question: why should a testator have a greater responsibility to his credi-
tors than he does toward his minor children?130 Both types of “debt” 
were entered into voluntarily, and both creditors and minor children 
can be said to have a right to a testator’s money after he or she dies.131 
 In addition to the moral arguments in favor of requiring parents 
to support their minor children, there are serious economic conse-
quences for failing to do so.132 As previously mentioned, surviving 
                                                                                                                      
124 See 1 Blackstone, supra note 19, at *435 (noting that natural law provides the 
source of the duty of parents to support their children); Brashier, supra note 3, at 4. 
125 See Brashier, supra note 3, at 4–6. Indeed, Blackstone reminds us of the aspect of 
choice that leads to the existence of a child: 
 The duty of parents to provide for the maintenance of their children is a 
principle of natural law; an obligation . . . laid on them not only by nature 
herself, but by their own proper act, in bringing them into the world: for they 
would be in the highest manner injurious to their issue, if they only gave the 
children life, that they might afterwards see them perish. By begetting them 
therefore they have entered into a voluntary obligation, to endeavour, as far 
as in them lies, that the life which they have bestowed shall be supported and 
preserved. 
See 1 Blackstone, supra note 19, at *435. 
126 See Brashier, supra note 3, at 5–6 & n.21 (discussing various state support statutes 
that require able parents to support their children while living). Brashier further notes, 
“When a minor child’s parent dies, the child’s need does not suddenly disappear.” Id. at 7; 
see also Knowles v. Thompson, 697 A.2d 335, 336–40 (Vt. 1997) (discussing the importance 
of continued child support after divorce and after the death of a parent). 
127 See Brashier, supra note 3, at 19 (“If anything, the parent will be more concerned 
about restrictions that affect him during his lifetime. At his death, wealth is irrelevant to 
his decaying corpse.”). 
128 See id. at 5 n.21. 
129 See id. 
130 See id. 
131 See 1 Blackstone, supra note 19, at *425. 
132 See Batts, supra note 5, at 1199. 
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spouses are entitled to a statutory share of the decedent’s estate based 
in part on the justification that surviving spouses should not become 
wards of the state.133 This justification is as compelling, if not more so, 
when applied to the disinheritance of minor children who are, in al-
most all circumstances, unable to provide for themselves.134 
 When a parent cannot or will not support his or her minor chil-
dren, the state has a responsibility to step in and provide for them.135 In 
the case of children whose parents cannot support them for financial, 
physical, or other reasons, the use of state money to provide for these 
children is necessary and commonly accepted.136 Parents who voluntar-
ily choose not to provide for their children in their testamentary plans, 
however, are a different story.137 These parents pass a financial burden 
to others—typically either to the surviving custodial parent or the 
state.138 Thus, in addition to the moral arguments that should induce 
                                                                                                                      
133 See id. 
134 See id. at 1999–1200. Professor Batts notes: 
The surviving spouse might have assets independent of the deceased, or may 
be able to establish another financially supportive relationship through re-
marriage or cohabitation with a significant other. None of these options is 
available to the minor child, who did not voluntarily or knowingly establish 
the family relationship with the testator. If public policy has seen fit to protect 
spouses from disinheritance, the same statutory protections should be pro-
vided for children. 
Id. at 1200; see also Jan Ellen Rein, A More Rational System for the Protection of Family Members 
Against Disinheritance: A Critique of Washington’s Pretermitted Child Statute and Other Matters, 15 
Gonz. L. Rev. 11, 47 (1979). Professor Rein explains: 
While few would gainsay the moral right of the spouse to protection against 
disinheritance, a decedent’s dependent children would seem to have an even 
higher moral claim to such protection. Spouses, after all, enter into the hus-
band-wife relationship voluntarily at an age when they can protect their inter-
ests while children do not volunteer to be brought into the parent-child rela-
tionship thrust upon them at birth. 
Rein, supra, at 47. 
135 See Brashier, supra note 3, at 5. 
136 See id. at 5 (noting that in instances where parents are unable to support their chil-
dren, “society steps in to assist the incapable parent, recognizing that it is in society’s best 
interest to ensure that all of its young are provided with the opportunity to become con-
tributing members”). 
137 See id. (“[S]ociety must require by law that the capable parent support his children 
despite his abnegation of moral responsibility.”). 
138 See Batts, supra note 5, at 1229 (“[A]lthough the parental support obligation is ap-
plicable to both parents, in many instances the surviving parent may not have sufficient 
independent resources to provide for the child.”). 
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the states to enact legislation to protect minor children from disinheri-
tance, there are compelling economic reasons as well.139 
 Our current system and the family maintenance system, which rely 
on ad hoc judicial correction to provide for disinherited children, are 
both burdensome, inconsistent, and costly.140 Because courts are al-
ready using doctrines to “correct” disinheritance of children, we could 
improve upon this judicial inclination by adopting legislation that 
would protect minors against disinheritance with greater consistency 
and less judicial discretion.141 Protectionist legislation would expressly 
ensure that American courts are not bogged down by time-consuming 
and costly will contests that could be avoided with a statutory share for 
minor children.142 
 In addition to taxing the judicial system, will contests are finan-
cially undesirable for families (both the named beneficiaries and the 
contesting parties) because much of the decedent’s estate can be de-
pleted during the course of the litigation.143 In fact, as a result of the 
high cost of litigation, it is likely that most disinherited children are dis-
suaded from contesting a parent’s will.144 Thus, there may be disinher-
ited heirs who do not even receive the benefit of judicial doctrines such 
as undue influence.145 
 Enacting legislation that would prevent the disinheritance of mi-
nor children would likely be met with little resistance, since Americans 
generally believe that parents should not be able to disinherit minor 
children.146 In one study, 860 residents of Nebraska were asked whether 
parents should be legally allowed to will property outside the family and 
                                                                                                                      
139 See id. (explaining that, when a parent disinherits a minor child, “the state must 
step in and support the child while the deceased parent is free to leave estate assets to 
strangers at the expense of both the children and the state”). 
140 See Dukeminier et al., supra note 1, at 520 (discussing the wide and flexible use of 
doctrines such as undue influence to amend testamentary plans); Foster, supra note 69, at 
1213–14 (discussing the flexibility of family maintenance systems that allow courts to 
amend testamentary dispositions on a case-by-case basis); supra Part II.B. 
141 See In re Will of Kaufmann, 247 N.Y.S.2d 664, 685–86 (App. Div. 1964), aff’d, 205 
N.E.2d 864 (N.Y. 1965); Gaines v. Frawley, 739 S.W.2d 950, 955 (Tex. App. 1987); Lipper v. 
Weslow, 369 S.W.2d 698, 703 (Tex. App. 1963); Chester, supra note 7. 
142 See Kaufmann, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 685–86; Gaines, 739 S.W.2d at 955; Lipper, 369 S.W.2d 
at 703; Batts, supra note 5, at 1222–25; Chester, supra note 7. 
143 See Rosenfeld, supra note 118, at 187 (“Between one-fourth and one-third of an es-
tate can be eaten up by legal costs when parties contest a will.”). 
144 See id. at 188 (“[The] time, energy, and expense of litigation do dissuade most peo-
ple from raising legal objections. Those who are not dissuaded by the expense are often 
prevented by social pressures from family and kin.”). 
145 See Dukeminier et al., supra note 1, at 520. 
146 See Batts, supra note 5, at 1232–33. 
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leave nothing to the children.147 Approximately ninety-three percent of 
those interviewed believed that parents should not be allowed to disin-
herit children under twenty-one years of age.148 In fact, 63.4% of re-
spondents believed that parents should not be able to disinherit chil-
dren over twenty-one years of age.149 This study, along with many like it, 
indicates that, in general, Americans would be amenable to laws that 
would specifically outlaw the disinheritance of minor children.150 
 Ultimately, minor children are in need of legislative protection 
against disinheritance.151 Children, unlike adults, lack the political 
power to fight for their needs; thus, the legislature must step in and 
demand that children’s support needs are met.152 
IV. The Solution: Amend the Uniform Probate Code to Include 
a Forced Heirship Provision Similar to Louisiana’s 
 In order to protect minor children from disinheritance by their 
parents, the UPC should adopt a forced heirship provision akin to that 
of Louisiana.153 As a model code, the UPC sets the tone for many state 
laws, and many states have adopted statutes that are substantially similar 
to those in the UPC.154 Forced heirship would be preferable to a family 
maintenance system in the United States because the American pro-
pensity toward litigation likely would make the family maintenance 
model too burdensome on American courts.155 Additionally, the out-
come certainty that would result from a forced share system would en-
sure the support of minor children and would aid in parents’ estate 
planning.156 Forced heirship would protect both minor non-custodial 
                                                                                                                      
147 See Julius Cohen et al., Parental Authority: The Community and the Law 23, 
77 (1958). 
148 See id. 
149 See id. 
150 See id.; Batts, supra note 5, at 1230 n.173 (listing empirical studies of people’s know-
ledge of and attitudes toward the laws of inheritance in the United States). 
151 See Brashier, supra note 3, at 22. 
152 See id. 
153 See La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 1493 (2008); Batts, supra note 5, at 1253. 
154 See Andrew Stimmel, Note, Mediating Will Disputes: A Proposal to Add a Discretionary 
Mediation Clause to the Uniform Probate Code, 18 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 197, 214 (2002) 
(noting that eighteen states have enacted the UPC, either in whole or in substantial part, 
and that “most other states have enacted portions of it”). Stimmel further notes that the 
UPC is very influential: “Because of the participants and the drafting process, a uniform 
code carries significant persuasive weight on state legislators when contemplating reform 
in their own statutory codes.” Id. at 215. 
155 See Batts, supra note 5, at 1216; Foster, supra note 69, at 1215; supra note 80. 
156 See Batts, supra note 5, at 1225, 1227; Brashier, supra note 3, at 7. 
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children, who are most likely to be disinherited by their non-custodial 
parent, as well as the states by ensuring that the children do not need-
lessly become wards of the state.157 
 Amending the UPC in this way should not be problematic.158 First, 
as mentioned above, studies show that Americans generally do not be-
lieve parents should be able to disinherit their minor children.159 Thus, 
there is likely to be little backlash against a law prohibiting this behav-
ior.160 Additionally, judicial use of curative doctrines in cases of disin-
heritance demonstrates that the testamentary freedom that Americans 
value is more of a fiction than a reality.161 
 Moreover, true testamentary freedom is further curtailed by the 
familial, financial, and estate administration obligations that must be 
satisfied before the final distribution of property under the will is ac-
complished.162 Many states have family allowances, homestead laws, and 
exempt property set-asides that allow the surviving spouse and minor 
children to claim certain assets.163 Additionally, creditors must be paid 
out of the estate before (and can even make claims after) other distri-
butions are made.164 Finally, almost all states have some form of spousal 
elective share.165 Thus, the notion of complete testamentary freedom is 
in some respects illusory, and a forced share for minor children is sim-
                                                                                                                      
157 See Batts, supra note 5, at 1225; Brashier, supra note 3, at 3, 5. 
158 See Cohen et al., supra note 147, at 23, 77; Batts, supra note 5, at 1230 n.173, 1232–
33 (listing empirical studies of people’s knowledge of and attitudes toward the laws of in-
heritance in the United States). 
159 See Cohen et al., supra note 147, at 23, 77; Batts, supra note 5, at 1230 n.173, 1232–
33. 
160 See Cohen et al., supra note 147, at 23, 77; Batts, supra note 5, at 1230 n.173, 1232–
33. 
161 See Leslie, supra note 84, at 238 (“[O]ur law is no stranger to the concept of testa-
mentary familial duty, and often imposes such a duty overtly. In fact, the urge to restrict 
testamentary freedom in favor of the family is almost universal; most legal systems ex-
pressly protect family members from disinheritance.”); Dayan, supra note 18, at 384–85. 
162 See Batts, supra note 5, at 1243. 
163 See id. Every state has a family allowance statute that authorizes the probate court to 
set aside an allowance for the maintenance and support of the surviving spouse, and usu-
ally the minor children. See Dukeminier et al., supra note 1, at 475. This allowance, how-
ever, is limited to a fixed period. See id. Homestead laws vary by state, but they are designed 
to protect the family home for the use of the surviving spouse and minor children, “free 
from the claims of the decedent’s creditors.” See id. at 474. The personal property set-aside 
is the right of the surviving spouse (and often minor children) to receive certain “tangible 
personal property of the decedent up to a certain value,” often including household furni-
ture and clothing. See id. 
164 See Batts, supra note 5, at 1245. 
165 See Dukeminier et al., supra note 1, at 476 n.2 (“Georgia is the only separate prop-
erty state without an elective share statute, though it does mandate at least one year of 
support for the spouse.”). 
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ply another obligation that must be met before the testator’s testamen-
tary plan can be carried out.166 
Conclusion 
 As American family demographics change, so too must the laws 
designed to protect minor children. The disinheritance of minors pos-
es a problem for American children as well as for the states because 
children who do not receive support from their deceased parents are 
more likely to become wards of the state. Today, with an unprecedented 
number of divorces and re-constituted families, the number of non-
custodial children is on the rise, and this group has an increased risk of 
disinheritance. In order to ameliorate the disproportionate burden on 
non-custodial children, states should adopt legislation that would re-
quire parents to provide for their minor children at death. Studies 
show that such laws would likely be popular with the American public. 
By adopting a provision akin to Louisiana’s forced share statute, the 
UPC will provide the necessary inspiration for states to adopt similar 
legislation of their own. 
                                                                                                                      
166 See Batts, supra note 5, at 1243–45. 
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